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Notes
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE FAIR
DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
The FairDebt Collection PracticesAct provides an aggrieveddebtor with
a private remedy against an abusive debt collector in order to deter unfair
debt collection practices. The authorcompares the Act with the comparable
provisions of the Truth in Lending Act and concludes that private enforcement will be ineffective since the Act lacks sufficient incentives for debtors to
bring individualactions andfew class actions will proceed because collection
practices are rarely uniform as to large numbers of affected debtors.

ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1977, President Carter signed into law' the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 2 amending the increasingly
comprehensive Consumer Credit Protection Act. 3 The express purpose

of the FDCPA is "to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by
debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from
using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers
at debt
against debt collection abuses." 4 The Act is aimed primarily
5
agencies.
collection
independent
collection abuses by
1. 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1382 (Sept. 20, 1977).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-92m
(effective March 20, 1978)) [hereinafter cited as FDCPA].
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-91f (1976), FDCPA, Pub. L. No. 94-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977).
The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-66 (1976) is probably the most familiar part
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
4. FDCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 802(e), 91 Stat. 874 (1977).
5. The provisions of the FDCPA apply to any person engaged "in any business the
principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or
attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or
due another," or to "any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses
any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or
attempting to collect such debts." Id. § 803(6). Because the Act does not apply to
finance companies, banks, thrift institutions, department stores, or in-house collectors,
it covers less than 1% of all debt collections in the United States. The Debt Collection
PracticesAct: Hearings on H.R. 11969 Before the Subcomm. on ConsumerAffairs of the
House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1976)
(remarks of Rep. Wylie) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 11969 Hearings]. The rationale for
such limited coverage was "that independent debt collectors are the prime source of
egregious collection practices." 123 CONG. REC. S13,513, S13,854 (daily ed. Aug. 5,
1977) (remarks of Sen. Riegle). Most creditors collecting past due accounts are generally
restrained from using abusive collection practices by their desire to protect their good
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Illegal collection practices and limitations on collection procedures
are clearly enumerated "within the four-corners" of the Act. 6 In
general terms the FDCPA restricts the contacts a collector can make to
acquire information about a consumer, 7 restricts communication with
the consumer, 8 prohibits harassment or abuse, 9 and prohibits false or

misleading representations. 10 The collector must communicate specific

information concerning the debt being collected, validate the debt if
that is requested, 1 and must not furnish deceptive forms. 12 Legal
actions by debt collectors are also restricted. 13 The provision on unfair
practices demonstrates the breadth of some of the statutory language.

Six specific unfair practices are enumerated, but the statute specifically
states they are not to limit the general rule that "[a] debt collector may
not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect
any debt.' 14 Regulatory agencies are expressly denied the power to
promulgate regulations with respect to debt collection practices, 15 but

some of the provisions may still be subject to broad judicial interpretation.
To ensure compliance with the provisions of the Act, Congress
established two vehicles for enforcement. The first is a specific civil
remedy to induce private consumer enforcement of the Act. 16 The
will. Independent collectors, on the other hand, "are likely to have no future contact
with the consumer and often are unconcerned with the consumer's opinion of them." Id.
A thorough study of defaulting debtors, however, indicates that even though independent collection agencies use coercive tactics most frequently, small loan companies,
direct sellers, general retailers, and finance companies also use abusive tactics. D.
CAPLOWrrz, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 183 (1974)

(interviews with 1,331 debtors).
6. [Ihe Federal Trade Commission has no rulemaking power, no regulatory
authority, so there will not be a shelf full of regulations promulgated by the
Federal Trade Commission to enforce the law. The law is within the four
comers of this bill now before the Members, and if there is not a sanction found
therein, the Federal Trade Commission has to come back to this Congress to
find out what they are supposed to do in the case of a practice which they find
or think should be declared to be an unethical or unlawful practice. In other
words, Congress is the final authority.
123 CONG. REC. H2924 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Wylie) (emphasis
added). See also id. at H2928 (remarks of Rep. Evans).
7. FDCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 804, 91 Stat. 874 (1977).
8. Id.§ 805.
9. Id. § 806.
10. Id.§ 807.
11. Id.§809.
12. Id.§ 812.
13. Id. § 811.
14. Id.§ 808.
15. "Neither the [Federal Trade] Commission nor any other agency referred to in
subsection (b) may promulgate trade regulation rules or other regulations with respect to
the collection of debts by debt collectors as defined in this title." Id. § 814(d).
"(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, any debt collector
16.
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second enforcement -mechanism is administrative, with the greatest
responsibility resting with the Federal Trade Commission. 17 Unlike
other subchapters of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 8 the

FDCPA contains no provision for criminal liability.' 9 As in the other
who fails to comply with any provision of this title with respect to any person is
liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of"(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such
failure;
"(2)(A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional
damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or
"(B) in the case of a class action, (i) such amount for each named
plaintiff as could be recovered under subparagraph (A), and (ii) such
amount as the court may allow for all other class members, without regard
to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1
per centum of the net worth of the debt collector; and
"(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing
liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee
as determined by the court. On a finding by the court that an action under
this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the
court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to
the work expended and costs.
"(b) In determining the amount of liability in any action under subsection (a), the court shall consider, among other relevant factors"(I) in any individual action under subsection (a)(2)(A), the frequency
and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such
noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional; or
"(2) in any class action under subsection (a)(2)(B), the frequency and
persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such
noncompliance, the resources of the debt collector, the number of persons
adversely affected, and the extent to which the debt collector's noncompliance was intentional.
"(c) A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under
this title if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the
violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
"(d) An action to enforce any liability created by this title may be
brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the
amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within
one year from the date on which the violation occurs.
"(e) No provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to
any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion
of the Commission, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such opinion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other
authority to be invalid for any reason.
Id. § 813.
17. FDCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 814, 91 Stat. 874 (1977).
18. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976).
19. The original House version of the FDCPA provided for criminal liability. H.R.
5294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 813, 123 CONG. REC. H2931 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1977). But this
met with major objections during the House debates. 123 CONG. REc. H2933-34 (daily
ed. Apr. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). The House later accepted the Senate
amendment deleting the provision for criminal liability. 123 CONG. REC. H8996 (daily ed.
Sept. 8, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Annunzio).
20. E.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976); Fair Credit Reporting Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-81o (1976); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, as amended by
Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257.
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subchapters, 20 however, private attorneys general actions by consum21
ers are clearly intended to be the primary enforcement tool. '
It is the purpose of this Note to determine, after briefly examining
the need for the FDCPA, whether private individual and class actions
by harassed debtors will successfully deter abusive debt collection
practices. In many ways the private enforcement provisions of the

FDCPA mirror the private enforcement provisions of the Truth in
Lending Act. 22 In other important aspects, however, the FDCPA
provisions are innovative.23 In evaluating the private enforcement
mechanisms under the FDCPA, this Note will draw upon judicial
responses to enforcement actions under the Truth in Lending Act, with

particular emphasis on consumer class actions.
I.

THE NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION

The variety of abusive debt collection tactics used by creditors24 and the lack of uniform and effective remedies available to
harassed consumers have been widely documented.2 5 Debt collectors
21. "The committee views this legislation as primarily self-enforcing; consumers
who have been subjected to collection abuses will be enforcing compliance." S. REP.
No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2967, 2971. "[T]he chief means of obtaining compliance with the act has always
been meant to be by way of the civil liability Section, that is, by enabling the consumer to
sue whenever there has been a violation of the act." 123 CONG. REC. H8996 (daily ed.
Sept. 8, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Annunzio).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976).
23. See notes 67 & 117 infra and accompanying text.
24. Collection abuse takes many forms, including obscene or profane language,
threats of violence, telephone calls at unreasonable hours, misrepresentation of
a consumer's legal rights, disclosing a consumer's personal affairs to friends,
neighbors, or an employer, obtaining information about a consumer through
false pretense, impersonating public officials and attorneys, and simulating
legal process.
123 CONG. REC. S13,854 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Reigle). For some vivid
examples of abusive collection techniques in operation, see The Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on H.R. 5294 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-27
(1977) (testimony of William R. Mann); FairDebt CollectionPracticesAct: Hearingson
S. 656, S. 918, S. 1130, and H.R. 5294 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 58-84
(1977) (statement of Karen Berger); H.R. 11969 Hearings, supra note 6, at 29.
25. See, e.g., Greenfield, Coercive Collection Tactics-An Analysis of the Interests
and the Remedies, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Shenfield, Debt Collection Practices:Remedies
for Abuse, 74 CoM. L.J. 336 (1969); Comment, Recent Statutes RegulatingDebt Collec-

tion, or Nunc, De Minimis Curat Lex, 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 1274 (1973);
Comment, Debt Collection Practices:The Needfor Comprehensive Legislation, 15 DUQ.
L. REV. 97 (1976); Comment, Effectively RegulatingExtrajudicialCollectionof Debts, 20
ME. L. REV. 261 (1968); Comment, Proposalsfor Limiting Collection Practices:New
Hope for the Debtor in Default, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 685 (1977); Comment, Focus
on Debtors'Rights-Makingthe Bill CollectorPay, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 681 (1975).
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were encouraged to use abusive collection practices because of the
inconsistent results reached under common law tort theories 26 and the
general inefficiency of state27 and federal 28 legislation in providing
adequate remedies for collection abuse. The tort theories of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, 29 defamation, 30 invasion of privacy, 31
intentional interference with contractual relations,32 malicious prosecution,"3 and abuse of process 34 were not developed with a view
toward the debtor-creditor relationship. Therefore, suits for debt
collection abuse do not conform well to these theories.3 5
The principal problem debtors face in most tort actions is the heavy
burden of proof placed on those seeking compensation for emotional
and/or mental distress. Although harassed debtors have often met these
26. See notes 29-40 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 41-44 infra and accompanying text.
28. See notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text.
29. George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971) (debt
collector who (without privilege to do so) by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to a debtor, is liable for such emotional distress and
resulting bodily harm); Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So. 2d 154 (1963).
See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 49-62 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 (1965).
30. Ragland v. Household Fin. Corp., 254 Iowa 976, 119 N.W.2d 788 (1963) (to
obtain recovery a debtor must show either that the imputation affects him in his
business, trade, or profession, or that he should be awarded special damages); Schieve v.
Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co., 71 Ohio L. Abs. 350 (1955); W. PROSSER, supra
note 29, at 737-51; RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, at § 559.

31. An actionable invasion of privacy arises where there is a wrongful intrusion into
one's private activities so as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation
to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340

(1956). This standard protects creditors from unduly sensitive (and feigning) debtors.
Goldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957). See W.
PROSSER, supra note 29, at 812-18; RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, at §§ 652 A-I.
32. Long v. Newby, 488 P.2d 719 (Alas. 1971) (debt collector subject to suit for
intentionally causing another party to breach a contract with plaintiff). See W. PROSSER,
supra note 29, at 927-49; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, at §766 (Tent. Draft No. 23,
1977).
33. Avco Delta Corp. v. Walker, 22 Ohio App. 2d 61, 258 N.E.2d 254 (1969)
(plaintiff must allege and prove termination of prior proceedings; lack of probable cause
to institute civil suit is not sufficient to support an action for malicious prosecution). See
W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 834-56; RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, at §§ 653-73.
653-73.
34. Gore v. Gorman's Inc., 148 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mo. 1956), appeal dismissed,
244 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1957) (to maintain action for abuse of process, some benefit must
have accrued to guilty party and some collateral disadvantage to other party). See W.
PROSSER, supra note 29, at 856-58.
35. Recognizing the deficiencies of traditional tort theories, Texas courts have
developed a new tort theory of "unreasonable collection efforts" which provides aggrieved debtors with another avenue of relief. See Martin, A Creditor'sLiability for
Unreasonable Collection Efforts: The Evolution of a Tort in Texas, 9 S. TEX. L.J. 127
(1967).
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heavy burdens, recovery has been too infrequent to deter collectors
from using such tactics.3 6 Furthermore, this ad hoc approach has failed
to develop standards delimiting unreasonable collection practices,
leaving collectors and debtors uncertain about borderline tactics. 37 For
example, a plaintiff bringing a tort action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress must demonstrate that his emotional distress was the
result of extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the debt
collector. 38 Some courts have required the distress suffered to be
severe, 39 and some older decisions have refused to allow recovery
n0
without proof of physical injury!
Opponents of the FDCPA argued that state legislatures should
solve the problem of debt collection abuse. 41 Although many states
have enacted legislation in this area,42 over one-third of the United
States' population resides in states where regulation is either ineffective or completely lacking.43 Even in states which have enacted effective legislation, consumers are still subject to harassment by collectors
44
from other states who use interstate channels for collection purposes.
36. See Comment, Proposalsfor Limiting Collection Practices:New Hope for the
Debtor in Default, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 685, 687-89 (1977).

37. Rester, Regulating Debt Collection Practices: The Social and Economic Needs
and a CongressionalResponse, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 547, 551 (1977).

38. E.g., George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 252-55, 268 N.E.2d 915,
920-21 (1971); Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So. 2d 154 (1963).
39. E.g., Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 149-51, 246 So. 2d 154, 158
(1963).
40. E.g., Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
41. E.g., 123 CONG. REC. H8996 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Bauman);
id. H2933 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Rousselot).
42. "37 States and the District of Columbia do have laws regulating debt collectors." H.R. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1977).
43. Inhere are 13 States, with 40 million citizens, that have no debt collection
laws. These states are Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
and South Dakota. Another 11 States (Alaska, Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming),
with another 40 million citizens, have laws which in the committee's opinion
provide little or no effective protection.
Id.
44. H.R. 11969, Hearings,supra note 6, at 216-30 (statement of Sherry Chenoweth);
134 CONG. REc. H2926 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Vento). Congress was
careful in drafting the FDCPA not to preempt state legislation, so comprehensive and
effective state regulation can continue to function. FDCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-109, §§
816-17, 91 Stat. 874 (1977). These sections describing the relation of the FDCPA to state
law were the outgrowth of strong congressional belief that states should be allowed to
enact and enforce their own legislation regarding debt collection:
The [Senate] Committee believes that this law ought not to foreclose the
States from enacting or enforcing their own laws regarding debt collection.
Accordingly, this legislation annuls only "inconsistent" State laws, with
stronger State laws not regarded as inconsistent. In addition, States with
substantially similar laws may be exempted from the act's requirements (but
not its remedies) by applying to the Federal Trade Commission.
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Finally, existing federal legislation provides no adequate remedy
for injuries suffered by harassed debtors, nor does it effectively deter
unreasonable collection practices. Although several federal laws relate
to debt collection practices, 45 they were not written with a view to debt
collection abuse and they have not been successful in stopping such
abuse. 46 In the debt collection area, the Federal Trade Commission has
47
the only set of guidelines delimiting unfair collection practices.
Furthermore, none of these federal statutes contain an express private
recovery provision so the debtor cannot recover for the harm he
suffered. 48
II.

INDMDUAL PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT ACIONS UNDER THE

FDCPA

The primary mechanism for inducing compliance with the FDCPA
is private litigation. 49 Because the principal aim of the Act is to
encourage debt collectors to comply with its provisions, 50 Congress
developed incentives to sue within the provisions of the statute in order
to make the legislation self-enforcing. As in other modem remedial
legislation, notably the Truth in Lending Act, 51 the FDCPA encourS. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1977). A similar view was expressed in the
House Report:
The Committee does not intend to preclude legislative experimentation by
the States in the area of debt collection practices. Any State wishing to so
experiment in passing strong legislation in this area will have a free hand to do
so and may apply for an exemption under Section 817.
H. REP. No. 131, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1977).
45. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976) ("Unfair methods of
competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are
declared unlawful."); Postal Services Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1718 (1976) (defamatory or
threatening letters constitute a crime); Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3005
(1970) (false representations through the mail prohibited); 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (1970) (billing
for unordered merchandise prohibited); Wire or Radio Communication Act, 47 U.S.C. §
223 (1970) (abusive or harassing interstate or foreign telephone calls are a federal crime).
46. 123 CONG. REC. H2921 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Annunzio). See
H.R. REP. No. 131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977).
47. FTC Guides Against Debt Collection Deception, 16 C.F.R. § 237.0-.6 (1977).
48. H.R. REP. No. 131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977). See also Carlson v. CocaCola, 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding no implied private cause of action under the
prohibition on unfair or deceptive trade practices in the Fair Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976)).
49. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
50. "The goal of this legislation is to stop unethical debt collectors from using
abusive tactics." 123 CONG. REC. H2921 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep.
Annunzio).
51.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails to
comply with any requirement imposed under this part or part D or E of this
subchapter with respect to any persons is liable to such person in an amount
equal to the sum of...
in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction, or (ii) in the case of an individual
action relating to a consumer lease under part E of this subchapter, 25 per
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ages private attorneys general actions by permitting a harassed debtor
to obtain recovery above and beyond compensatory damages. 52 The
civil liability provision of the FDCPA allows injured debtors to collect
actual damages, statutory damages, and reasonable attorney's fees
from a violator. 53 It differs from its Truth in Lending counterpart in
that the FDCPA does not provide a minimum recovery for a successful
4
individual action.5
It is doubtful that many debtors will recover actual damages under
the FDCPA. Nothing suggests that courts will be less stringent in their
demand for proof under the statute than they have been in traditional
tort actions. 55 Unless violations are extreme and outrageous, permitting the plaintiff to overcome these evidentiary hurdles, the potential
recovery of actual damages will not be a strong inducement for a
debtor to bring an individual civil action. The actual damage provision
of the Truth in Lending Act 56 presents similar problems. The typical
Truth in Lending violation does not involve actual damages, 57 and in
instances where actual damages are a possibility the proof requirement
is prohibitively strict. 58
centum of the total amount of monthly payments under the lease, except that
the liability under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than
$1,000; or ....
• . . in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability,
the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined
by the court.
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A), (a)(3) (1976).
"[Congress] invited people . . . whether they themselves were deceived or not, to
sue in the public interest. Following familiar precedents, it encouraged such actions by
providing, in addition to the incentive of public service, costs and a reasonable attorney's fee above the minimum recovery of $100." Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust
Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Truth in Lending class action).
52. FDCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 813(a)(2), (a)(3), 91 Stat. 874 (1977).
53. FDCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 813, 91 Stat. 874 (1977). Statutory damages for
individual actions are "such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000." Id.
54. Compare id. with Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976).
55. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of proof requirements under traditional tort theories.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1976).
57. In a typical case involving a violation of the Truth in Lending Act, individual
damages are likely to be quite small, if not nonexistent. E.g., Eovaldi v. First Nat'l
Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 548 (N.D. I11.1972); Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54
F.R.D. 412, 416 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
58. McCoy v. Salem Mfg. Co., 74 F.R.D. 8, 13 (E.D. Mich. 1976) ("The scheme of
Truth in Lending is clear: actual damages must involve a showing that the plaintiff could
have gotten credit on better terms but for the breach. Because such a showing is so
difficult, statutory damages are available to a plaintiff who can prove a technical
violation.").
Congressional debates leading to the 1974 amendments of the civil liability provision
stressed the difficulty or impossibility of proving actual damages in a Truth in Lending
action. See 119 CONG. REC. 25,419 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Hart); id. at 25,418
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Failure to prove actual damages, however, does not preclude
recovery. Under both Acts additional statutory damages are recoverable merely on the showing of a violation. The driving force behind
most individual actions under the FDCPA will probably be the enforcement provision providing for the recovery of "such additional
damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000." 59 In
determining the amount of the statutory damages in an individual
action, the Act instructs the court to consider "among other relevant
factors . . . the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the
debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to
which such noncompliance was intentional . . . . 6
Under the FDCPA, as originally proposed, debtors could recover a
minimum statutory damage award of $100, with a maximum recovery
of $1,000.61 Under this early version, no factors were set forth to guide
the courts' discretion in determining the appropriate damages to be
awarded. 62 The proposal was amended to its present form because of
congressional concern that the minimum award of $100 would encour63
age nuisance law suits by consumers.
The validity of the nuisance argument in the context of the FDCPA
is questionable. The fear of nuisance suits grows out of experience
under the Truth in Lending Act, where creditors were unable to keep
abreast of complex and constantly changing regulations. In this situation debtors could, and did, initiate suits for minor technical violations
of Regulation Z64 to recover the $100 minimum award. The FDCPA,
however, is clearly distinguishable from the Truth in Lending Act
because prohibited debt collection practices and limitations on collection procedure are expressly enumerated within the four comers of the
(remarks of Sen. Proxmire); 118 CONG. REC. 14,824-25 (1972) (letter from Federal
Reserve Board Vice Chairman Robertson); 118 CONG. REC. 14,824 (1972) (remarks of

Sen. Hart); 119 CONG. REC. 25,418 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
59. FDCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 813(a)(2)(A), 91 Stat. 874 (1977).
60. Id. § 813(b)(1).
61. See H.R. REP. NO. 131, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1977) (to accompany H.R.
5294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 812 (1977)).
62. Id.
63. 123 CONG. REC. H8996 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Annunzio); S.
REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1977).
64. E.g., Kasey v. Albin, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,709 (W.D. Ky. 1974)
(use of term "time balance" rather than required term "total of payments" held to
violate Regulation Z). In general, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1977), requires "that
lenders state specifically and in uniform language what their charges are to lend money
or credit in practically all consumer transactions of less than $25,000, and in all real
estate transactions, regardless of the amount." Macey, Award of Attorney Fees as a
Stimulant to Private Litigation Under the Truth In Lending Act, 27 Bus. LAW. 593, 594
(1972).
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Act. 65 Therefore, it will be relatively easy for even a small collector to
become familiar with the requirements of the FDCPA. Although some
66
provisions of the FDCPA lend themselves to broad interpretation,
debt collectors should still be protected from nuisance suits by the
court's power to award the defendant collector reasonable attorney's
fees when "an action. . .[is] brought in bad faith for the purpose of
harassment. "67 For these reasons nuisance suits should not be a problem under the FDCPA, and a minimum damage award would be
desirable as an additional incentive to encourage individual enforcement of the Act.
The final inducement for private enforcement of the FDCPA, as
under the Truth in Lending Act, is that a successful plaintiff may
collect "the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's
fee as determined by the court.''68 Under the Truth in Lending Act the
fees generally granted by the court after a successful individual action
have proven to be inadequate to attract sufficient numbers of competent lawyers and the burden of providing counsel has fallen on a few
public-spirited lawyers who are already overcommitted. 69 Since the
language of the two Acts is the same, it is doubtful that the fees
awarded under the FDCPA will be enough to interest lawyers in
bringing actions under the Act. Many actions brought by debtors,
particularly in cases where the debtor complains of tactics not specifically set forth in the Act, 70 will be lost unless the debtor can find an
attorney willing to take the case who is conversant with the FDCPA.
Moreover, it is unlikely that a debtor pro se or one with the aid of an
unproficient or overburdened attorney will be able to meet the heavy
burden of proof necessary to recover actual damages under the Act.
Because the FDCPA will usually be violated when the collector seeks
to recover on unpaid bills, indicating that the plaintiff debtor has no
funds to pay counsel, it is unlikely that an attorney can expect more
65. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
66. E.g., FDCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-109 § 806, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) ("A debt collector
may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress,
or abuse any person."); id. § 807 ("A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means."); id. § 808 ("A debt collector may not use unfair or
unconscionable means.").
67. Id. § 813(a)(3).

68. Id. The identical language is found in the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a)(3) (1976).
69. Note, Recent Developments in Truth in Lending Class Actions and Proposed
Alternatives, 27 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104-05 (1974).

70. For example, § 806 states: "A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the
natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection
with the collection of a debt." The section proceeds, "without limiting the general
application of the foregoing," to specify particular conduct in violation of the section.
Since the language is not exhaustive, the attorney will have to delineate the scope of

liability under this section.
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than the statutory fee for his services. Thus, the fees awarded under the
Act must be realistic or it will severely impair the private enforcement
scheme.
Aside from problems of incentive, it has generally been found that
individual actions have not been instrumental in ensuring compliance
with the Truth in Lending Act as was originally hoped. Most debtors
were not sufficiently familiar with the complex regulations under the
Truth in Lending Act to know that they had not received full disclosure. 7 However, a debtor's knowledge of the terms of the Act does not
appear to be as crucial under the FDCPA as it is under the Truth in
Lending Act. Debtors subjected to harassment or abuse by a debt
collector will probably believe instinctively that their rights are being
violated regardless of their knowledge of the FDCPA. Some of the
72
conduct prohibited by the FDCPA, however, is defined technically.
In these instances, as with the Truth in Lending Act, a debtor would
have to be familiar with the FDCPA to be aware that the collector
violated the Act.
Even though a harassed debtor may know his rights have been
violated, he may not initiate an action if the recovery is insufficient to
outweigh the costs in time and effort. Although individual actions
under the FDCPA will probably be brought with greater frequency
than individual tort actions because the incentives to sue are greater,
still, the threat of individual actions may not be enough to encourage
conformity with the Act. Under the Truth in Lending Act, individual
actions have not proved significant in effecting compliance by creditors because they do not pose a sufficient threat to the financial wellbeing of the creditors. Defendants under the FDCPA are likely to be
small operations,7 3 and individual actions may be a more effective
threat to them. On the other hand, a debt collector's livelihood depends
upon the efficient collection of debts. Those collectors who engage in
abusive but efficient collection practices will be discouraged only if the
recovery and litigation costs of private individual actions outweigh the
amounts so collected. Thus, unless the magnitude of individual recoveries or the frequency of civil suits increases dramatically under the
FDCPA, when viewed in light of experience under the Truth in
71. See Note, supra note 69, at 104.
72. For example, a debtor would have to be familiar with the FDCPA's prohibitions

to know that a debt collector in his collection efforts can not employ "[t]he use of any
business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector's
business, company or organization." FDCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 807(14), 91 Stat.
874 (1977).
73. The average size of the more than 5,000 collection agencies across the country is
8 employees. S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
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Lending Act, individual actions will probably not cause collectors to
modify their abusive and unfair debt collection techniques.
III.

CLASS ACTION ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE FDCPA

A.

The Truth in Lending Background

A FDCPA civil liability suit brought as a class action allows the
representative plaintiff to recover the amount he would have recovered
under an individual action and allows other class members to recover
an amount determined by the court "without regard to a minimum
individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per
centum of the net worth of the debt collector." 74 The Act also sets
forth factors to be considered by the court in determining the amount of
a collector's liability in such an action. 75 These guidelines (with one
exception) 76 and the ceiling imposed on class action recovery under the
FDCPA are similar to the class action provisions of the Truth in
Lending Act.
As originally enacted, the Truth in Lending Act 77 contained no
provision dealing with creditor liability in a class action. 78 As in other
lawsuits, however, the class action device was available if the requirements of Rule 23 were met. 79 Courts, however, disfavored class suits
based on violations of the Truth in Lending Act, and by April 1974,
certification had been denied in 40 of the 51 reported decisions where
the plaintiff sought to bring a class action.80 The typical rationale for
denying class status in the Truth in Lending context was set forth in
Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co."1 The plaintiff in
74. FDCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 813(a)(2)(B), 91 Stat. 874 (1977). A class member
may also recover actual damages, court costs, and attorney's fees. Id. § 813(a)(1), (3).
75. Id. § 813(b)(2). See note 16 supra.
76. In determining the award in a class action under the Truth in Lending Act, the
court must consider the the amount of any actual damages awarded. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)
(1976). This is not a factor in a FDCPA class action. Id.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970).
78. The legislative history was also silent on this point. "[Tihere is nothing in the Act
itself, the rule, or the Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure
with respect to it which expressly or impliedly precludes class actions in a Truth in
Lending case." Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 474 F.2d 336, 343 (10th Cir. 1973).
79. Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in December, 1973
that the "clear trend of authority" was that class actions were inalpropriate in Truth in
Lending actions, LaMar v. H&B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 467-68 n.17 (9th
Cir. 1973), virtually every other court that denied class action status in a Truth in
Lending case pointed out that nothing in the congressional history of the Act justified a
conclusion that class actions were prohibited. E.g., Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart,
Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1974); Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, 59 F.R.D.
99 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
80. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 763 n.9 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 885 (1974).
81. 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Ratner sought to initiate a class action to recover the $100 minimum
82
statutory damages for each of 130,000 potential class members.
Judge Frankel reasoned that the "broad open-ended terms" of Rule 23
"call[ed] for the exercise of some considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature" on the part of the judiciary. 8 3 He agreed with the
defendant that the proposed minimum recovery of $100 for each class
member would be "a horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment,
unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any benefit to
defendant, for what is at most a technical and debatable violation of the
Truth in Lending Act.''84 Judge Frankel concluded that allowing a
class action in the case was essentially inconsistent with the civil
remedy specifically provided in the Act.8 5 He ruled, therefore, that the
action for the
23(b)(3) class action was not superior to the individual
6
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy A
In order to eliminate this judicial barrier to certification, Congress
amended the civil liability provision of the Truth in Lending Act to
limit class action recovery. 8 7 The legislative history of this amendment
demonstrates that Congress intended the class action to be an effective
deterrent against Truth in Lending violations and, consequently, an
inducement to encourage compliance with the Act.88 Moreover,
Congress recognized that if the ceiling on recovery was too low, it
would discourage class suits, and Congress further amended the civil
liability provision in 1976 by raising the ceiling from $100,000 to
82. Id.at 414.
83. Id.at 416.
84. Id.

85. Id.
86. Id. For a discussion of the "superiority" requirement in 23(b)(3) Truth in
Lending and FDCPA class actions, see notes 153-167 infra and accompanying text. For
further examples of cases where courts denied class certification based on fear of a
debilitating recovery, see Alsup v. Montgomery Ward Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 93 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (damage claims aggregating eight billion dollars); Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338

F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (damages sought in excess of one billion dollars); Rogers v.
Coburn Fin. Corp., 54 F.R.D. 417,419 (N.D. Ga. 1972) ("minimum total recovery would
be in the neighborhood of $30,000, exclusive of costs and attorney fees. This could well
put defendant out of business."); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134, 138 (D.

Kan. 1972) (the potential recovery calculated to be at least $18,000,000 for each alleged
violation of the Act).
87. Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a)(2)(B), 88
Stat. 1518 (1974). For a discussion of the history of the 1974 amendments to the Truth in
Lending Act, see Note, The Truth in Lending Class Action, 40 ALB. L. REV. 753,768-72

(1976).
88. E.g., S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 43 (1973) (supplemental remarks
of Sens. Tower, Bennett, and Brooke); 120 CONG. REC. 34,768 (1974) (remarks of Rep.
Sullivan); 119 CONG. REC. 25,419 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Hart); 118 CONG. REC. 14,824

(1972) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
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$500,000. 89 Although the amendments eliminated the concerns about
potentially massive recovery voiced in the early decisions regarding
class action certification, 9° they could not alter the requirements of
Rule 23 which must be satisfied before a class action can be certified. 91
The class action recovery provision of the FDCPA appears to be
the result of experience under the Truth in Lending Act. Keeping this
historical background in mind, the Note will now examine whether the
class action provision will encourage debt collectors to comply with
92
the provisions of the FDCPA, thus realizing the intent of Congress.
89. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1976). Still, Congress retained
the provision which would limit recovery to 1% of the net worth of the creditor if that
amount was less than $500,000. Id. Referring to the amendment, the Senate Committee
stated:
The setting of any ceiling on class action liability is meant to limit the
exposure of creditors to vast judgments whose size would depend on the
number of members who happened to fall within the class. The risk of any
ceiling on class action recoveries is that, if it is too low, it acts as a positive
disincentive to the bringing of such actions and thus frustrates the enforcement
policy for which class actions are recognized. Under the present Truth in Lending Act, where the class action ceiling is $100,000, several courts have noted the
incompatibility of that ceiling with the effective use of the class action device
The Committee wishes to avoid any implication that the ceiling on class
action recovery is meant to discourage use of the class action device. The
recommended $500,000 limit, coupled with the 1% formula, provides, we believe, a workable structure for private enforcement. Small businesses are
protected by the 1% measure, while a potential half million dollar recovery
ought to act as a significant deterrent to even the largest creditor.
S. REP. No. 590, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (citations omitted), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 431, 438.
90. "[Ihe amendment represents a legislative response to those judicial decisions
denying the availability of class actions in Truth in Lending cases. . . . [The] aggregate
limitation on class action liability minimized the potential for the enormously large
recoveries that lead to the denial of class action treatment." Postow v. Oriental Bldg.
Ass'n, 390 F. Supp. 1130, 1140 (D.D.C. 1975). "Congress, in so amending the civil
liability provision, recognized that courts were not certifying class actions and that there
was a need to encourage voluntary creditor compliance via potential class liability."
Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (citation omitted).
91. "[A]lthough Congress may have intended not to foreclose the possibility of class
actions for the statutory penalty, it cannot be said that such a class action is essential to
the deterrent operation of the statute, and the court should not dilute the requirements of
Rule 23 to permit it." McCoy v. Salem Mfg. Co., 74 F.R.D. 8, 11 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
(quoting Weathersby v. Fireside Thrift Co., 22 FED. R. SERv. 2d 44, 48, 5 CONS. CRED.
GUIDE (CCH) 98,640, at 88,181-82 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
For a discussion of the additional problems created by the 1974 amendment, see
notes 113-16 infra and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 87, at 774; Note,
Truth in Lending and the FederalClass Action, 22 VILL. L. REV. 418 (1977).
92. The legislative history of the 1974 amendment to the Truth in Lending Act
indicates that class actions are important for encouraging compliance with that Act:
The [Federal Reserve] Board believes that potential class action liability is an
important encouragement to the voluntary compliance which is so necessary to
insure nationwide adherence to uniform disclosure . . . . [The threat of class
action exposure] elevates a possible Truth in Lending lawsuit from the ineffec-
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B.- The Prerequisitesof Rule 23(a)
The basic purpose of the class action is to provide a mechanism to
aid in the more efficient administration of justice by permitting a
representative to sue where a large group of persons are interested in a
matter. 93 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 94 designates
situations where class actions are appropriate. Clause (a) of Rule 23
lists four prerequisites which must be satisfied in order to bring a class
action: "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable
[numerosity], (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class [commonality], (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [typicality] and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class [fair and adequate representation]." 95 While
failure to satisfy these conditions relegates the representatives and
96
members of the class to enforcement by means of individual actions,
compliance does not mean that a class will be certified. The class must
also fit within the provisions of Rule 23(b). 97
Courts have encountered few problems in finding that the requirements of numerosity, commonality, and typicality are satisfied in
Truth in Lending class actions. 98 Since the essence of a Truth in
Lending suit is the creditor's failure to accurately disclose finance
charges in an understandable manner, it follows that where disclosures
are made on standardized forms which are widely distributed claims
will be numerous and, in most cases, identical between members. 99 In
addition to the numerosity and commonality requirements assured in
cases involving widely distributed standardized forms, claims for
statutory damages will also be uniform in cases where a standard
finance charge has been used, thus permitting an easy apportionment
tive "nuisance" category to the type of suit which has enough sting in it to
insure that management will strive with diligence to achieve compliance.
Inaccurate and Unfair Billing Practices: Hearings on S. 1630 and S. 914 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Credit of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1973). This reasoning is also applicable to class actions
under the FDCPA.

93. C.

WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

306 (1971).

94. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
95. Id. 23(a)(1)-(4).
96. ProposedAmendments to Rules of Civil ProcedureForthe United States District
Courts, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Advisory Committee Note].

97. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
98. E.g., Sarafin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 585 (N.D. Ill.
1977); McCoy v.
Salem Mfg. Co., 74 F.R.D. 8 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
99. See note 98 supra.
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of damages among the class members. The typicality and commonality
requirements may be difficult to satisfy under the FDCPA. While
Truth in Lending class action suits are likely to involve the use of
standardized forms which violate the Act, under the FDCPA, a
violator may use a variety of prohibited techniques against a large
group of debtors, with variations in the manner and/or degree of abuse
used. 100
Although a group of debtors seeking class action status may have
suffered from a variety of collection abuses, the issue of whether
questions of law or fact are common to the group should not be
summarily dismissed. According to Professor Newburg:
Rule 23(a)(2) does not require that all questions of law or
fact raised in the litigation be common. The test or standard
for meeting the (a)(2) prerequisite is qualitative rather than
quantitative-that is there need be only a single issue
common to all members of the class. Therefore, this requirement is easily met in most cases. When the party opposing
the class has engaged in some course of conduct that affects
a group of persons and gives rise to a cause of action, one or
more of the elements of that cause of action will be common
to all of the persons affected."0 '
Thus, a representative plaintiff would argue that the general pattern of
unfair collection practices used on all members of the proposed class
constitutes a course of conduct sufficient to satisfy the commonality
requirement of 23(a)(2). Since the Rule requires only a single common
question of fact or law, the existence of other issues which concern
only certain members of the class should not prevent a finding of

commonality. 102
The typicality requirement assures that the class representative
shares claims and defenses characteristic of those of the other class
members. Thus, to some extent, it overlaps with the requirement that
there be questions of fact or law common to the class. Because of this
overlap, the typicality and commonality issues are often decided together. 1 3 Mere factual differences between the treatment individual
100. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
101. I H. NEWBURG, CLASS ACTiONS 180-81 (1976) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).

102. In Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971), a
Truth in Lending class action, the court noted: "[M]inor variations which may exist
among the members of the class do not outweigh the common issues of law and fact."
Id. at 318-19.
The question of commonality recurs under 23(b)(3): "Questions of law or fact
common to the members of a class [must] predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members." See notes 134-152 infra and accompanying text.
103. E.g., Butkus v. Chicken Unlimited Enterprises, Inc., 15 FED. R. SERV. 2d 1067,
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class members and the representative received from a debt collector
should not render that representative's FDCPA claims or defenses
atypical if they arose from the same practice or course of conduct
which gave rise to the class claims. Although the typicality requirement is generally satisfied in Truth in Lending actions, 10 4 class certification was denied when the representative plaintiff had dealt with only
one of six defendants. 105 In LaMarv. H& B Novelty & Loan Co., the
court held that the representative's claim was not typical of those
against the other five defendants. 10 6 Under the FDCPA, it can be
expected that class status will be denied for lack of typicality if the
representative initiates the action against a group of collectors who
allegedly used prohibited tactics against members of the class when the
representative was only contacted by some of the collectors.
Nonetheless, because typicality refers to the nature of the claim or
defense of the class representative and not to the specific facts from
which it arose or to the relief sought, factual differences between the
treatment of individual class members that will arise in a FDCPA class
action should not render the representative's claim atypical if it arises
from a general practice or course of conduct and is based on the same
107
legal theory as the claims of the other class members.
The representative must also demonstrate that he can "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." 10 8 The factors a court
should consider in making this decision are: first, whether the representative's interests are compatible with the interests of the class
1069 (N.D. Ill. 1971). "[Two requirements of subsection (a) [(a)(1) and (a)(2)] can be
grouped under the rubric that there are questions of law and/or fact which are common to
the class and which are typified by the proposed representatives of the class." Id.
The typicality requirement is also closely aligned with the 23(a)(4) prerequisite which
requires that "the representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class" members:
[Tihe ultimate purpose of both [23(a)(3) and (a)(4)] is to protect absent class

members. Subsection (a)(3) focuses on the consideration of whether the representative's interests are truly aligned and consistent with the interests of the
class members; subsection (a)(4) goes more to the subjective consideration of
the legal ability of plaintiff's counsel to represent the class as well as the
adequacy of the individual representative himself to pursue a course of conduct
beneficial to absent members.
Note, Class Actions: Defining the Typical and Representative Plaintiff Under Subsections (a)(3) and (4) of FederalRule 23, 53 B.U.L. REV. 406,408-09 (1973). See also 3B
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.06-2, at 23-325 (2d ed. 1976).
104. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
105. LaMar v. H&B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973).
106. Id.
107. See Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245, 250-51 (D. Minn. 1971) (class action
challenging constitutionality of Minnesota claim and delivery statute).
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
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members; 109 second, whether the representative is willing to vigorously prosecute the action; 110 and finally, whether the attorney selected
by the representative party is competent.'II The issue of the attorney's
competence does not turn on any feature unique to a consumer credit
class action, and is to be determined by the court with a view toward
the general welfare of the unnamed class members.112 The first two
factors, however, have posed problems unique to the amended Truth in
Lending Act because of the statutory ceiling on class recovery.
In situations where the statutory ceiling comes into play, the pro
rata portion of the class award available to each class member will be
less than the $100 he could have recovered in an individual action. If
the representative plaintiff is willing to accept the smaller award, then
his interests remain compatible with those of the other class members." 3 Some class representatives have sought an award in the class
action equal to their potential recovery if an individual action had been
instituted. In Weathersby v. Fireside Thrift Co. 114 the representative
plaintiff and an intervenor proposed that the order certifying the class
contain a provision assuring that the amount of their individual recov115
ery would not be affected by the certification of the proposed class.
The court concluded that this proposal was unsatisfactory because
. . .the court would raise the possibility that it would award
to plaintiffs money that would otherwise go to unnamed
members of the class. Defendant properly argues that, under
these circumstances, the court cannot conclude that plaintiff
and intervenor "will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class" as required by Rule 23(a)(4) ....116
This problem should not arise under the FDCPA. In a successful action
under the FDCPA the plaintiffs can recover "such amount for each
named plaintiff as could be recovered [in an individual action, and]
109. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 638 (2d ed. 1977).
110. Id. at 633.
111. Id.at 632.
112. Id.
113. Chevalier v. Baird Savings Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140, 152-53 (E.D. Pa. 1976). This
may create new problems. CompareRollins v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 71 F.R.D. 540,545
(E.D. La. 1976) (lesser recovery for the representative plaintiff "creates serious doubts
whether plaintiff would be an adequate class representative because we cannot under-

stand why plaintiff wishes to pursue this as a class action. On this ground alone we
refuse to certify this suit as a class action without some adequate explanation for
plaintiff's altruism.") with Sarafin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 585, 589 (N.D.
IIl. 1977) ("Absent some evidence of impropriety (which is not present in this case), we
do not require an explanation of plaintiffs' choice of a more effective deterrent to a
creditor over greater personal gain for themselves.").
114. 22 FED. R. SERV. 2d 44 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
115. Id. at 47.
116. Id.
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such amount as the court may allow for all other class members,
without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the
lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt
collector." 117 This would appear to be a legislative response to judicial
application of the requirements of Rule 23 to the Truth in Lending Act
as observed in Weathersby. Not only does this statutory provision
relieve a fundamental antagonism between the interests of the named
plaintiffs and the unnamed class members, thus allowing the named
plaintiff to fairly and adequately represent them, it also provides an
118
incentive for the plaintiff to initiate a FDCPA class action.
Although possible problems may arise in satisfying the 23(a) prerequisites of typicality and commonality under the FDCPA, it is still
likely that these two requirements and the requirement of fair and
adequate representation can be met. Assuming that a large group of
debtors has been subjected to abusive debt collection practices so as to
make joinder impractical and satisfy the numerousity prerequisite, the
court must next address the issue whether the proposed class fits within
the parameters of subdivision 23(b). 119 If any one of the three
categories of Rule 23(b) can be satisfied, then the plaintiff class will be
certified.
C.

The Maintenance Requirements Under Rule 23(b)

1. Rule 23(b)(1)
A class action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1) when individual
suits would create the risk of inconsistent results which would prejudice the party opposing the class or when adjudications with respect to
117. FDCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 813(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 91 Stat. 874 (1977).
118. Aside from alleviating judicial barriers to the certification of class actions, the
FDCPA places plaintiff's counsel in a more comfortable position than the attorney
prosecuting a claim under the Truth in Lending Act. The Code of Professional Responsibility suggests that a lawyer exercise his professional judgment "solely for the benefit of
his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties .. " ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-1. Thus, if the named plaintiff's pro rata share of

potential class recovery will be less than his recovery in an individual action, the
attorney should recommend the individual action. However, the attorney may be tempted to recommend the class action route since attorney's fees resulting from a class action
may be substantially greater than those from an individual action. The possibility of such
professional misconduct has been cited as a reason why the Truth in Lending class action
is not superior to other methods of adjudication. E.g., Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333
F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (N.D. Ga. 1971). Under the FDCPA, an attorney will not be placed
in a position where he may be tempted to compromise his professional judgment because
the plaintiff can recover identical amounts as representative in a class action or in an
individual action.
119. For a general discussion of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b), see Advisory
Committee Note, supra note 96, at 100-04; Note, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b),
10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 539 (1969).
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individual members of the class would "as a practical matter" prejudice absent members of the class. 120 Courts have not been receptive to
requests for certification of Truth in Lending class actions under Rule
23(b)(1). In Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. ,121 the
court refused to allow a class to be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
explaining that "there is no suggestion that some perverse plaintiff
might sue . . . to compel less disclosure than defendant is now
supplying. The prospect of 'varying adjudications' is in a word imaginary.''122 The court in Rodriguez v. Family Publications Service,
3
Inc. 12
found Rule 23(b)(1)(A) inappropriate in a Truth in Lending
action to establish a monetary judgment. Although the defendant might
have to pay some class members and not others, this kind of incompatible conduct did not fall within (b)(1)(A). In Goldman v. FirstNational Bank, 124 the court found that (b)(1)(B) was not appropriate. For the
same reasons as set forth in these Truth in Lending cases, it would
seem that a FDCPA class action could not be maintained under Rule
23(b)(1).
2.

Rule 23(b)(2)

A class action cannot be premised on Rule 23(b)(2) where the relief
sought is exclusively or predominantly money damages.12 5 Because
subdivision 23(b)(2) is only to be applied in situations where injunctive
126
or declaratory relief is the primary reason for bringing the action,
courts in the Truth in Lending context have held the subdivision
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
121. 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
122. Id. at 415 (footnote omitted).
123. 57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1972). The court in Rodriguez also denied the plaintiff's
contention that 23(b)(1)(B) applied:
Contrary to plaintiff's contentions, the Advisory Committee's Note to clause

(B), demonstrates that the clause was intended to apply to situations, not
present here, where the members of the class each have rights in a common
organization, fund or contract which ought to be adjudicated together in order
to avoid unfair legal or practical advantage by one over another member of the
class . . . . Application here of clause (B) would make meaningless the re-

quirements set forth for an action under subdivision (b)(3) because any action
meeting the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) would be a precedent in a later action

involving similar questions ...
57 F.R.D. at 92-93 (citations omitted).
In Ratner, Judge Frankel also rejected the plaintiff's attempt to maintain a class
action under 23(b)(1)(3): "[C]lause (B) has even less plausibility for plaintiff's purposes.
Nothing has happened or can happen in the foreseeable course of this lawsuit that could

be 'dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.... .54

. . .

or substantially

F.R.D. at 415 (foot-

note omitted).
124. 56 F.R.D. 587, 591 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
125. See generally Advisory Committee Note, supra note 96, at 102 (1966).
126. Id.
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inappropriate when a monetary recovery is sought. 127 Even when the
representative has joined a demand for injunctive relief with a demand
for the civil remedy, certification has been denied because the members were not seeking predominantly injunctive relief. 128 But, if a
plaintiff elects to waive the civil remedy and seeks only to halt the
practices violative of the Act, a Truth in Lending class action can be
maintained under Rule 23(b)(2). 12 9 In most Truth in Lending cases,
however, damages are sought; the plaintiff must then look to subdivision (b)(3) to justify class action treatment. 130
It is unlikely that an argument for maintenance of a (b)(2) class
action under the FDCPA would receive a different judicial response
than similar proposals under the Truth in Lending Act. Although
plaintiff may be subject to continuing harassment and have a sincere
interest in halting the abuse, he is suing under a statutory provision that
provides for money damages. So, even if the representative in a
FDCPA action joins a demand for injunctive relief with a demand for
the civil remedy, courts will probably deny certification under 23(b)(2)
as has been done under the Truth in Lending Act. 131 While it is
unlikely that FDCPA suits will be certified as class actions under Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2), FDCPA suits may still be able to meet the
maintenance requirement of subdivision (b)(3).
127. E.g., Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 99, 105 (E.D.N.Y.
1973); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Eovaldi v.
First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 547 (N.D. I11.1972); Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56
F.R.D. 448, 451 (D. Ariz. 1971).
128. Graybeal v. American Sav. & Loan, 59 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 1973).
129. Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 390 F. Supp. 320, 324-25 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
130. E.g., Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587, 592-93 (N.D. III. 1972). In
this regard the Goldman court stated:

Rule 23(b)(3) is concerned primarily with class actions where damages have
been demanded. Thus, as a general rule, each member of a 23(b)(3) [class] has
suffered an individual wrong and is entitled to recover individual damages. In
the instant case, each member of the class would be entitled to recover a
minimum amount of $100 damages if liability is found. Under Rule 23, each
member of a Rule (b)(3) class is protected by special notice provisions, a right to
opt out from the class within a reasonable time and a right to enter an individual
appearance through counsel.
None of the rights given to members of a Rule 23 (b)(3) class are given to
members of a Rule 23(b)(2) class. The reason for this is obvious. An injunction
granted at the request of one or a few members of a class effectively precludes
the defendant from engaging in the enjoined conduct as to others as well.
Moreover, active participation of all class members as parties in an injunction
proceeding is unnecessary.
Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that where the predominant reason
for instituting a suit is the recovery of damages, as is obviously the case here, a
Rule 23(b)(2) class is not appropriate.
Id. at 592-93 (citations omitted).
131. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
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3.

Rule 23(b)(3)

Rule 23(b)(3) permits a class action to be maintained where "the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." 132 As the
Advisory Committee has explained:
In the situations to which this subdivision relates, classaction treatment is not as clearly called for as [under subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2)], but it may nevertheless be convenient
and desirable depending upon the particular facts. Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action
would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and
promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly
situated, without sacrificing procedural
fairness or bringing
133
about other undesirable results.
The first of the two requirements," 3 the predominance requirement,
has usually been easily met in Truth in Lending cases. Since most
Truth in Lending lawsuits involve disclosures made on printed forms
and calculations made by computers or obtained from rate books, the
questions of fact and law relating to the issue of liability will be, for the
most part, identical for all persons with claims arising out of a similar
transaction with the defendant. 135 Since large scale violation of the
FDCPA by a collector may involve a variety of prohibited practices,
differing in kind and in degree, 136 a representative for a FDCPA class
action may encounter greater difficulty satisfying the predominance
requirement than under the Truth in Lending Act.
Although a collector may have engaged in some course of conduct
that affects a group of debtors so as to meet the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality prerequisite, this does not assure satisfaction of the predominance
requirement. 137 It has been suggested that if it appears likely that the
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
133. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 96, at 102-03.
134. See note 132 supra.
135. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
136. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
137. The Advisory Committee has recognized that a common course of conduct may
not be enough to satisfy the predominance requirement:
[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it may remain so
despite the need, if liability is found, for separate determination of the damages
suffered by individuals within the class. On the other hand, although having
some common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class

action if there was material variation in the representations made or in the kinds
or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were addressed.

Advisory Committee Note, supra note 96, at 103 (citation omitted).
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class action will splinter into individual trials to determine the defendant's liability with regard to each class member, then "common
1 38
questions do not predominate, and a class action is inappropriate.'
In a typical FDCPA suit brought as a class action, if the class members
allege they were victimized by a variety of illegal collection practices,
it might be necessary for the court to examine independently each
alleged incident of collection abuse. Since this result would hardly be
conducive to achieving "economies of time, effort, and expense," 139 a
court would probably deny certification in such a case. 140 Alternatively, the court could divide the class, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4)(B), into
subclasses comprised of debtors who claim they were subjected to the
same unfair collection practice. This tactic, however, does not overcome the underlying difficulty of a FDCPA class action because in
order for a class member to recover he must demonstrate by individual
proof that he was the victim of a prohibited practice. 141
There may be cases in which the predominance requirement can be
satisfied for purposes of maintaining a FDCPA class action under
23(b)(3) depending on the kind of evidence underlying the alleged
violation. In Polimeros v. NationalAccount Systems, 142 a state class
action based on tort law, the representative alleged that the defendant
had willfully and maliciously sent a form letter to the class members'
employers informing them of the members' indebtedness and requesting certain information concerning each class member. The court
138. Comment, Litigatingthe Antitrust Conspiracy Under Amended Rule 23: Siegel
v. Chicken Delight, Inc. and School District v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 54 VA.
L. REV. 314, 318 (1968).
139. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
140. In Rogers v. Coburn Fin. Corp., 53 F.R.D. 182 (N.D. Ga. 1971), reinstated, 54

F.R.D. 417 (1972), a Truth in Lending suit was denied class certification for lack of
predominance. The court explained that no economy would be gained by a class action,
since it would still be necessary for the court to examine several thousand disclosure
statements to determine if each complied with the disclosure requirements imposed by
the act. The court feared that the suit would "rapidly degenerate into multiple lawsuits
separately tried, which is precisely what Rule 23(b)(3) prohibits." 53 F.R.D. at 183. On
rehearing, the court held common questions of law and fact did predominate. However,
the court denied class action treatment for lack of superiority. 54 F.R.D. at 418-19.
141. If subclasses are established by the court, a damage apportionment problem may
arise. Rule 23(c)(4)(B) states that "each subclass [shall be] treated as a class, and the

provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly." If a subclass is
to be treated as a class, the court must decide whether each subclass may receive a
statutory class action damage award or whether the original class as a whole may receive
one statutory damage award. If several small classes, originally one large class, were

each granted relief in an amount equal to the maximum statutory damages, the collector
could be subjected to the very liability which the statutory damage ceilings were intend-

ed to protect. This problem has not yet arisen in the Truth in Lending context. Comment,
Truth in Lending and the Federal Class Action, 22 VILL. L. REV. 418, 429, 440-42

(1977).
142. 45 Ohio App. 2d 235, 343 N.E.2d 138 (1975).
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certified the class pursuant to Ohio Rule 23(B)(3) 14 3 because the
members' claims of invasion of privacy, originating from the form
letter, were identical. Therefore, in cases where the class members'
claims arise from this kind of evidence-documentary evidence, readily produced, which permits the court to easily compare the claims of
the individual class members, the predominance requirement should be
satisfied.
Even though the source of the class claims is identical, if class
members seek actual damages the common questions may not predominate over individual questions.144 The proof required to show
actual damage (most often intangible mental or emotional injury) will
be just as involved and time-consuming as if a separate tort action were
brought by each class member. The principal purpose of Rule 23(b)(3)
is to litigate at once many similar claims that would otherwise require
numerous, repetitive individual suits. 145 If a FDCPA class consists of
one hundred members, each claiming actual damages, it is apparent
that this objective would be frustrated. The predominance problem
raised by actual damages, however, is not insurmountable. The trial
court has broad discretion under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to sever issues when
appropriate. Thus, the court could certify a class to determine the
FDCPA violation and hold separate hearings as to the actual damages
sustained by each member. 146 Moreover, unlike the Truth in Lending
Act, the factors to be considered by a court in awarding civil penalty
damages to a class under the FDCPA do not include the amount of
143. OHIO CIV. PRAc. R. 23(B)(3). The language of Ohio Rule 23(B)(3) is the same as
Federal Rule 23(b)(3).
144. Several Truth in Lending cases have alluded to this problem. E.g., Boggs v. Alto
Trailer Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1975) (district court decision to sever issue of
actual damages and liability remanded in part because of questions of predominance).
145. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 96, at 102-03.
146. See McCoy v. Salem Mfg. Co., 74 F.R.D. 8, 12-14 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (memorandum opinion):
While the statute itself and the legislative history both suggest that Congress
intended actual damages as a class action remedy for Truth in Lending Act
violations, this Court is convinced that the actual damage claims of class
members must be resolved on an individual basis. The "common issues of law
or fact" which make a class action superior for resolving issues of liability are
not present in the claims for actual damages. Since each plaintiff will have to
show that damages were sustained as a result of the failure to properly disclose,
i.e., that he or she would have gotten credit on more favorable terms but for the
violation, the proofs will necessarily be different for each class member.
Id. at 12 (footnote omitted). In certifiying the class as to the issue of liability only, Judge
Freeman concluded that: "[Tihe determination of liability would ihen be res judicata in
any action the class members desire to bring individually on the issue of actual damages." Id. at 13-14. In the context of the FDCPA it is reasonable to assume that courts
will follow the approach set forth in McCoy since each FDCPA individual member will
have to demonstrate that he sustained actual damages as a result of the violation.
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actual damages to be awarded. 4 7 A special master can later determine
the actual damages sustained by the class members without affecting
the court's award. 148
Plaintiffs seeking certification of Truth in Lending class actions
under Rule 23(b)(3) have also encountered difficulties when the defendant creditor asserts a counterclaim against one or more members of
the class. The defendant's counterclaim for the balance due on the debt
should not prevent a FDCPA class from satisfying the predominance
requirement. In the Truth in Lending cases the courts struggled to
decide whether the defendant's claim for the balance due on the debt
was a compulsory or permissive counterclaim under Rule 13.149 If a
compulsory counterclaim, it would have to be litigated with the Truth
in Lending claim, thereby destroying the predominance of common
issues. 150 In a FDCPA class acti6n, the debtors will not have received
the credit or loan from the independent collector. The collector's
counterclaim, therefore, should be held permissive because it does not
arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the unfair collection
practices which are the subject of the plaintiff's claim. 151 Permissive
counterclaims would not have to be litigated with the FDCPA liability
issue1 52 and therefore common issues would predominate.
Finally, in order to obtain class certification the class representative must demonstrate "that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."153
In the Truth in Lending context, particularly in the early cases, the
superiority requirement presented the greatest obstacle to class certifi147. Compare Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976) with FDCPA, Pub.
L. No. 95-109, § 813(b)(2), 91 Stat. 874 (1977).
148. A federal court can appoint a master to hear claims for actual damages under
Rule 53. Cf. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1966), motion to dismiss denied, 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd 417 F.2d 147
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). The district court certified the class to
determine the securities law violation, 259 F. Supp. at 683, severed the question of
individual damages, and appointed a master to hear claims for actual damages submitted
individually by each class member and to evaluate any defenses available to defendant in
regard to each of the individual claims. 286 F. Supp. at 729.
149. E.g., Rollins v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 71 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. La. 1976) (state law
counterclaims compulsory but plaintiff class members against whom defendant
counterclaimed dropped from class). Contra, Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (counterclaims held permissive). See generally Note, Truth in Lending
Act-Defendant's Debt Counterclaim-Compulsoryor Permissive?, 28 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 434 (1978).
150. See Rollins v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 71 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. La. 1976); Platt v. B.P.
Oil Corp., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,934 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
152. Id.

153. Id. 23(b)(3).
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cation. 154 Rule 23(b)(3) lists four factors for the court to consider in
determining whether a class action is superior to other available
methods:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely
to be encountered in the management of a
55
class action.
The courts in FDCPA cases will probably be most concerned with the
interest of individual class members in controlling their own litigation
and the manageability of the suit as a class action.
Because the class action may in theory result in a smaller recovery
for the class members than a series of individual suits,156 individuals
may have a great interest in controlling their own lawsuit. It has been
argued in the Truth in Lending context that the reduction in potential
recovery must be considered an "undesirable result" that renders the
class action inappropriate for lack of superiority.15 7 The problem is less
acute in a class action under the FDCPA because there is no minimum
statutory award in an individual action. While the FDCPA class members can never be assured in advance that they will receive awards
equal or greater than the award they could expect in an individual
action, it is likewise never certain they are receiving less. In a (b)(3)
class action the court can effectively let the potential class members
themselves determine their interest in controlling the prosecution of a
separate action. When notice is given under Rule 23(c)(2) those
concerned about the possibility of a smaller award can withdraw, and
thereafter the court can assume the remaining class members are
satisfied with a class action suit.
The manageability of the suit as a class action is another element
154. E.g. Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 474 F.2d 336, 345 (10th Cir. 1973) ("In denying

class action status it was sufficient for the trial court to determine on an adequate record
and for good reasons stated that the procedure was not superior to other procedures

irrespective of whether the common issues of fact or law were predominant.").
Prior to the 1974 amendment which imposed a ceiling on class recovery, most courts
denied certification on the grounds that the individual action method was superior
because potential class recovery was "absurd." See notes 80-86 supra and accompanying text.

155. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). These four factors, however, are not exhaustive. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 96, at 104.
156. See notes 113-118 supra and accompanying text.
157. E.g., Weathersby v. Fireside Thrift Co., 22 FED. R. SERV. 2d 44 (N.D. Cal.
1975).
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for the finding of superiority.' 5 8 Two considerations are likely to
render a FDCPA class unmanageable: first, the difficulties in identifying class members and second, the costly notice provisions of clause
(c)(2) of Rule 23. Under the Truth in Lending Act, these two factors
have not proven to be major barriers to the manageability of class
actions. Creditors must maintain records of credit transactions for two
years; 159 allowing potential class members to be easily identified
within the one year statute of limitations. 160 The FDCPA, however,
does not require a debt collector to maintain records of his contacts
with debtors. It will.thus be difficult for a representative desiring to
initiate a class action to identify potential class members who are
victimized by prohibited debt collection practices. Identification will
be relatively easy if the debt collector makes a record of the debtors
contacted and the collection practices used. However, because collection practices vary in relation to individual debtors depending on such
variables as whether the debtor is employed, has a phone, or lives with
family or friends, 161 and because it is unlikely that such records will be
kept, class identification will require a great deal of time, money, and
effort-the very items the rule seeks to economize.
If the problem of identifying class members is overcome, notice of
the action must be sent to them pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2) to ensure that
each class member is given the opportunity to withdraw from the class
and thus avoid being bound by the action. 162 Individual notice must be
sent to each member of the class whose name and address can be
ascertained through reasonable effort, 163 and the representative plain158. One commentator has listed five factors that a court should consider in determining whether a Truth in Lending class is manageable: (1) the size of the class; (2)
whether class members may be identified with ease or only after the expenditure of
considerable time, effort, and money; (3) whether actual damages are recoverable by
individual class members or whether recovery would be limited solely to the statutory

civil remedy; (4) whether counterclaims against individual members of the class are
present which may result in excluding them from the action (or in separate trials); and (5)
whether only miniscule benefits would accrue to individuals in a class even from a very
large dollar recovery in which the only benefits of the litigation would inure to the
attorneys. Knepper, The Superiority Requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) in Class Actions
Under The Truth in Lending Act, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 291, 302 (1976).
159. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(i) (1977).
160. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1976).
161. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
162. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him
from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether
favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and
(C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an
appearance through his counsel.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
163. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974).
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tiff must bear the cost of sending notice. 164 In a Truth in Lending
action the plaintiff may be able to take advantage of the defendant's
regular billing schedule and thus avoid paying postage for notice to
many class members. 165 In a FDCPA class action, however, the
representative will probably not have recourse to communication channels between the collector and debtor to convey notice of the action,
and thus will have to bear the full cost of notice himself. And since the
class representative is usually in default due to a lack of funds (and not
because he is withholding payments to contest the validity of the
debt),166 it is unlikely that he will be able to pay for notice to class
members. Although the cost of notification can be recovered by the
plaintiff if the suit is successful, 167 the requirement that he initially
meet this burden can be expected to reduce the number of FDCPA
class actions.
Although courts will undoubtedly recognize that the threat of a
class action under Rule 23 will have a potent deterrent effect on
collectors who employ practices prohibited by the FDCPA; 168 it is
likely, in view of the judicial response to Truth in Lending class
169
actions, that only a few special FDCPA classes will be certified.
Generally, the nature of the substantive issues that will be raised by a
FDCPA class claim, particularly the individual fact patterns which
give rise to the class members' claims, will not be capable of satisfying
the requirement that "questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.' 170 Furthermore, even if the predominance requirement is
satisfied, it is unlikely that an FDCPA class representative will be able
to convince a court that the class suit is superior to individual actions
due to the potentially higher recovery with private actions, and prob164. Id. at 177-79.
165. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539, 546-47 (W.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd
and remandedon othergrounds,496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
166.

123 CONG. REC. S13,854-55 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Riegle).

167. 53 F.R.D. at 546.
168. In the Truth in Lending context it has been found that the "threat of a class
action has a potent deterrent effect. Eliminating that deterrent. . . would emasculate
the enforcement provisions of the Act." Sarafin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 585,
588 (N.D. I11.
1977). Since the provisions of the FDCPA parallel those of the Truth in
Lending Act, it is reasonable to assume that the courts will find the FDCPA class action
to be an important deterrent to violative conduct.
169. The special case in which an FDCPA class probably will be certified is where a
collector utilizes a standardized collection procedure thus rendering questions of law and
fact identical among class members, and where the problems of manageability can be
overcome. See note 142 supra.
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added). See notes 132-54 supra and accompanying text.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:710

lems of manageability. 171 Thus, even though it appears as though
Congress desired to provide the FDCPA with provisions compatible
with the class action device, in practice courts will probably find that
the substantive provisions of the FDCPA and the procedural standards
and tests of Rule 23 do not jibe, resulting in the denial of class
certification. Without the potential for successful class actions under
the FDCPA, its remedial and deterrent effect will be blunted.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The FDCPA is limited not only in its application to independent
debt collectors, but also in its power to curtail prohibited collection
practices. While Congress intended that private remedial action be
the primary vehicle for enforcement of the FDCPA, as it is under
the Truth in Lending Act, it is unlikely that this goal will be realized.
In the area of individual actions, the incentives to sue are inadequate
due to the absence of any guaranteed minimum recovery. Therefore,
individual recoveries will be too infrequent under the FDCPA to
encourage compliance with its provisions. In the area of class actions,
experience under the Truth in Lending Act suggests that class certification under the FDCPA will also be infrequent. Classes satisfying the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) will probably falter on the maintenance
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Thus, while it appears that the FDCPA
will provide relief to some debtors, relief otherwise unavailable under
common law tort theories or existing state and federal legislation, it is
unlikely that the private enforcement mechanism of the FDCPA will
stop unfair debt collection practices. In this regard it has been suggested that Congress reconsider the limitation imposed on administrative
power under the FDCPA, so that the purpose of the Act may be better
172
realized.
MARC D. FuNK

171. See notes 153-67 supra and accompanying text.
172. Rester, Regulating Debt Collection Practices:The Social and Economic Needs
and a CongressionalResponse, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 547, 551 (1977).

